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1. Introduction 
With too little information, reasoning and learning systems cannot work effectively. 
Too much information can also cause the performance of these systems to degrade, in 
both accuracy and efficiency. It is therefore important to determine what information 
must be preserved, or more generally, i.e., what information is “relevant”. 
Reasoning about what is and is not relevant to the goals at hand is ubiquitous in 
humans. Much of this meta-theoretic reasoning occurs outside of the scope of our 
introspection; it is believed that over 90% of the neuronal connections in our brains are 
inhibitory and serve to discard or suppress inputs received through our senses. Moreover, 
when we engage in deliberate problem solving (e.g., writing this introduction, planning 
a trip, or learning a buyer’s profile from credit data), we explicitly reason about the 
relevance of entities in our conceptualization of the problem. In addition, in the context 
of computing within a problem formulation, we reason about the relevance of steps in 
that computation; e.g., which move to explore in game tree search or which variable 
to ignore in data analysis. The object of relevance reasoning is to simplify problem 
formulations and to eliminate wasted effort in computation. Relevance reasoning is 
crucial for agents like us with limited memory and computational resources; the benefit 
obtained from being able to derive appropriate actions within given resource limits far 
outweighs the expense of such reasoning. 
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This special issue, motivated by the very successful AAAI Fall Symposium on 
this topic [ I], addresses questions in automating relevance reasoning, focusing on 
autonomous systems with limited computational and sensory resources, embedded in 
dynamic environments. First, what is relevance reasoning? Is it different from other 
kinds of reasoning, such as default reasoning or common sense reasoning? Are there 
general definitions of relevance that transcend tasks? If relevance is task-specific, what 
is the relationship between a task and the kind of relevance reasoning appropriate for 
it? When is relevance reasoning necessary for autonomous systems? Can we provide 
a knowledge-level account of relevance reasoning independent of the syntactic details 
of how it is implemented in particular computational systems? What are the costs and 
benefits of relevance reasoning, and how do we quantify them? 
A key premise underlying the study of relevance is that there are general relevance 
criteria that can be articulated explicitly, independent of specific tasks and formulations. 
A related premise is that the cost of relevance reasoning will be offset by the ability to 
compute good action policies within resource limits. The 11 papers in this special issue 
put these premises to theoretical and empirical tests. 
One general way to define the meta-theoretic notion of relevance is in terms of 
“perturbations”: A specific “entity” (such as an action, training sample, attribute, back- 
ground proposition, or inference step) is irrelevant to a task in some context if the 
appropriate response to the task does not change by an unacceptable amount if we 
change the entity in that context. Otherwise, we view that entity as (somewhat) rel- 
evant to the task. This view is explicitly stated in the paper by Galles and Pearl, 
which deals with causality and where a perturbation corresponds to a material change 
in the physical world; it is also implicit in most of the other papers appearing in 
this specific issue. For instance, the learning papers of Greiner, Grove and Kogan, 
Kivinen, Warmuth and Auer, Kohavi and John and Blum and Langley all use the 
fact that an attribute is irrelevant to a classification function if the class label of 
an instance does not change if we change the value of that attribute. Baum and 
Smith define relevance of individual computational steps; in particular, they say that 
a leaf expansion in a game tree search computation is relevant if it has the poten- 
tial to alter the choice of move. Darwiche, Lakemeyer, and Levy, Fikes and Sagiv 
provide similar definitions of when a perturbation to a proposition leaves answers 
to a set of goal propositions unchanged in the context of some background the- 
ory. 
While there is significant agreement on the general definition of relevance, there is 
considerable variety in how they are instantiated in the context of specific tasks or 
task classes. Baum and Smith demonstrate the subtleties involved in instantiating this 
general definition to a specific computation. A leaf expansion in a game tree search 
could impact the utility of the move under consideration as well as the choice of future 
leaf expansion decisions. The implementation of their relevance criterion forces them to 
move away from the traditional model of making point estimates of the value of leaf 
positions to using parametric value distributions that can be learned during the course of 
a game. They show that the distinction between important and unimportant lines of play 
in a game can be captured using relevance measures on distributions over evaluation 
scores. 
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The nature of the learning task necessitates different choices in the structure of criteria 
for determining attribute relevance. Thus, while Kivinen, Warmuth and Auer and Kohavi 
and John assume the same attributes are relevant over all instances, Greiner, Grove and 
Kogan and Baluja and Pomerleau consider tasks where different attributes are relevant 
for different instances, making attribute relevance a function of the specific instance 
rather than that of an entire instance set. The task in Baluja and Pomerleau’s paper is 
to detect lane marking in an image to help a vehicle follow a road. This task is difficult 
as the image is often cluttered with distracting extraneous objects (e.g., other vehicles, 
pedestrians, etc.) that can look superficially like the lane marking that the vehicle is 
seeking. To avoid these distractions, the system focuses its search on the “relevant” 
part of the image; this subset is based on its expectation of the lane marking positions, 
which is based on previous images in the sequence. In contrast, the analysis by Kivinen, 
Warmuth and Auer does not require ever explicitly identifying which attributes are 
relevant-it only uses the observation that there is a set of k relevant attributes in its 
analysis. Blum and Langley survey work in defining and using other relevance criteria 
in concept learning. 
The difficulty in finding realizable implementations of relevance definitions in reason- 
ing is illustrated by Galles and Pearl, Levy, Fikes and Sagiv, Darwiche, and Lakemeyer. 
Lakemeyer postulates semantic definitions of the relevance of a proposition to another 
in the context of a theory and shows that it is intractable to compute exact relevance re- 
lations even under propositional logic. This work motivates the need for approximations 
as considered by Khardon and Roth who demonstrate that reasoning can be efficient 
when restricted to relevant models (e.g., vivid knowledge bases of Levesque) of formu- 
las under consideration. Darwiche recasts Pearl’s definition of conditional independence 
(irrelevance) in probabilistic reasoning [4] in the logical context and provides several 
efficient graph-theoretic algorithms for decomposing complex logical calculations into 
simpler computations. Similarly, Galles and Pearl show that most aspects of causal rel- 
evance can be captured by directed graphs and that such graphs can be used as theorem 
provers, to test whether new relevance relations follow from, or are consistent with, a 
set of relevance premises. 
Can a pure knowledge level account of relevance reasoning be provided? Kohavi and 
John and Levy, Fikes and Sagiv provide evidence that such an account is either unlikely 
to be comprehensive or not be very useful. Kohavi and John empirically demonstrate that 
the determination of attribute relevance in an induction task cannot be made independent 
of the induction algorithm (which therefore necessitates a symbol level analysis). Levy, 
Fikes and Sagiv, building on earlier work by Subramanian in [5], provide a proof- 
theoretic account of irrelevance in the context of efficient deductive reasoning with large 
Horn theories, in sharp contrast to Lakemeyer’s purely semantic account. 
Almost all of the papers in the special issue provide theoretical guarantees and/or 
experimental results on the utility of relevance reasoning. Baluja and Pomerleau demon- 
strate that by using relevance analysis to focus the attention on lane pixels in an image, 
the accuracy of the choice of steering direction is improved by 20%-a significant per- 
formance improvement on the task. Baum and Smith conduct an extensive empirical 
evaluation of their policy of expanding relevant leaf nodes in the context of Othello. 
They show that their programs play a much stronger game than alpha-beta pruning and 
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that the superiority of their approach increases rapidly with additional time resources. 
An interesting open empirical question is whether the relevance criterion of Baum and 
Smith would benefit the game of chess. 
The following papers on logical reasoning demonstrate how logical inference of var- 
ious forms can be made more efficient by explicit reasoning about relevance. The paper 
by Darwiche provides conditions under which reasoning about logical conditional inde- 
pendence simplifies complex computations (belief change, entailment and satisfiability) 
into small sets of much simpler “local” calculations. Levy, Fikes and Sagiv’s paper 
demonstrates that reasoning with large Horn databases can be significantly speeded 
up by explicit elimination of irrelevant facts. Khardon and Roth take a very differ- 
ent approach, showing that models which summarize relevant information in a set of 
formulas can be the basis of very efficient schemes for logical as well as default rea- 
soning. 
The papers on learning also demonstrate that “less is better”, i.e., they show that 
learning algorithms produce more accurate classifiers if trained on only the subset of 
“relevant” training examples, or if given only the values of the “relevant” attributes 
of the training examples. The review paper by Blum and Langley uses insights from 
the machine learning and the computational learning theory communities to summarize 
results, both characterizing the “state of the art” implemented systems (e.g., into “em- 
bedded” versus “filter” versus “wrapper” approaches, contrasting feature selection with 
feature weighting schemes, and considering both selecting relevant examples, and rele- 
vant attributes) and providing useful theoretical explanations. Kohavi and John explain 
why a learner, trying to produce an accurate classifier from a limited pool of training 
examples, can do better if it uses only the subset of relevant attributes. They then present 
an extensive empirical comparison between their approach, which involves “wrapping” 
the basic learner, as a black box, within an algorithm that searches for the optimal 
subset of features with a “filtering” algorithm, that uses other, learner-independent prin- 
ciples to select the subset of attributes. Greiner, Grove and Kogan present a learning 
model where a helpful teacher, who uses the target decision tree to label instances, also 
tells the learner which attributes in the target tree were used to classify the instance. 
They show that this relevance information can be extremely useful: e.g., while there 
is no known algorithm that can “PAC-learn” arbitrary decision trees in the standard 
model (where the learner sees the complete set of attribute values for each instance) 
[6], this learning task become trivial if the learner is told exactly which features are 
relevant for each instance. Finally, Littlestone earlier presented a very clever algorithm 
for learning linear-separators, called WINNOW, which had the intriguing property that 
it scales linearly with the number of relevant attributes but only logarithmically with 
the total number of attributes [ 21; by contrast, the typical PERCEPTRON algorithm 
scales linearly here [3]. As most of these results were only upper bounds, it was 
not clear whether there really was a difference here. The paper by Kivinen, Warmuth 
and Auer answers this, by showing that an adversary can force the Perceptron algo- 
rithm to make exponentially more mistakes (in the context of on-line learning) than 
WINNOW. 
We hope these papers awaken interest in relevance reasoning and inspire new answers 
to the open questions posed earlier in this introduction. 
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